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Scientists do not make government policy, and quite rightly they are not expected to, so should they be surprised when policy 
deviates from what they understand to be the evi-
dence? Many scientists (including social scientists) 
make an essential contribution to decision-making 
within government but recent experience suggests 
to me that there can be confusion amongst some 
scientists about their role and also about how they 
can bring their influence to bear most effectively.
Before becoming a Chief Scientific Adviser in 
UK government I was a full-time professor at the 
University of St Andrews, and I probably had a 
fairly typical scientist’s view of policy. Experience 
within my discipline allowed me to speak with 
some authority on whether policy was generally 
consistent with current scientific knowledge, and 
whether the information being used was robust. 
I also had some specialist knowledge that allowed 
me to provide direct advice about some specific 
policy decisions. I often held a view of whether 
policy was taking a right or wrong direction when 
the subject was within my own self-appointed area 
of knowledge but I chose to be agnostic when it 
was not.
As I now realise there are two difficulties 
with this position that require careful manage-
ment. The first is the issue of where authoritative 
comment stops and political point of view starts; 
and the second is that any position taken by a 
scientist is usually a low-dimensional view of a 
multi-dimensional (or complex) problem. Together, 
these have a tendency to create a gap between 
the aspirational views of what policy outcomes 
should look like, often promoted by the idealised 
views of scientists, and what these outcomes really 
look like once they have been through the mangle 
of policy development.
This can be the source of the dissatisfaction 
some scientists have with government. Sometimes, 
often mistakenly, scientists think they are not 
being listened to and they can quickly change 
from being a dispassionate commentator to being 
an agitator when it appears that insufficient weight 
has been given to scientific evidence. This sets up 
an unsatisfactory dynamic between scientists and 
policy-makers that can also involve politicians. 
It also promotes the suspicion there is among 
policy-makers that scientists are not as independent 
as they claim. For example, it is very easy to be 
drawn in to promoting one’s own solutions because 
of the funding implications.
Strictly speaking, the role of science should 
be to provide information to those having to 
make decisions, including the public, and to ensure 
that the uncertainties around that information 
are made clear. When scientists start to stray 
into providing views about whether decisions 
based upon the evidence are right or wrong they 
risk being politicised. In general, it is important 
for scientists to stick to the evidence and its 
interpretation.
I will illustrate this through the lens of a 
recent example involving the control of bovine 
tuberculosis (TB) in the UK. Controversy has arisen 
because of the decision to use the culling of 
badgers as one method to control bovine TB, at 
least in England. The epidemiology of bovine TB 
is fiendishly complex and the UK government 
is struggling to control the disease. It is right for 
scientists to comment on the information available 
but several policy options are feasible based upon 
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the evidence. Indeed, if one compares globally 
among all jurisdictions where bovine TB is a 
problem, one can find many policy options being 
pursued. In the UK alone there are different policies 
being pursued in England (proactive badger 
culling), Wales (badger vaccination) and Northern 
Ireland (test and vaccinate), and the Republic of 
Ireland has opted for yet another option (reactive 
badger culling). It would be inaccurate to suggest 
that, based upon the evidence, any of the policy 
options being pursued across the UK and Ireland 
is more or less correct; all are possible even if 
the evidence suggests that some might be more 
successful than others.
The message in this case is that, based upon 
the same evidence, it is possible to pursue quite 
different policy options. Unfortunately, some 
scientists have been drawn in to the public debate 
about which policy option is correct. If scientists 
start to say one or other option is right or wrong 
then they are beginning to take the position of 
politicians and they devalue the scientific evidence 
they claim to present.
Some important mechanisms exist to help 
scientists convey their views to government. Science 
advisory committees are an essential mechanism 
to achieve this and most of these recruit their 
membership through open competition with 
independent oversight and scrutiny. Although 
in some cases membership of these committees 
means scientists agree to abide by the rules of 
consensus and collective opinion, the way in which 
committee advice is published or delivered to 
politicians means that dissenting, or minority, views 
can still be expressed. Many scientists show a 
very high level of commitment to such advisory 
activities, and their specialist knowledge can have 
considerable impact on decisions and policies, 
but the academic community needs to provide 
greater recognition of this contribution.
If scientists make value judgements outside 
this framework they risk confusing the public, 
policy-makers and politicians about the difference 
between scientific opinion and personal belief. 
The grey area in which there is scientific uncer-
tainty is somewhere that scientists need to tread 
very carefully. On the one hand, those making the 
decisions—the elected politicians—will benefit 
from well-formed opinion to guide them through 
this tricky region at the science-policy interface, 
but scientists should not be surprised if politicians 
place considerably more weight upon other factors 
when key decisions have to be made without the 
support of a strong evidence base.
This highlights a further issue of confusion often 
prevalent among scientists and that politicians 
often perpetuate when challenged—the belief 
that all decisions need to be evidence-based. 
My experience is that most policy decisions are 
informed to greater or lesser degrees by evidence 
but rarely is it practical or even desirable to base 
decisions entirely upon scientific evidence. The 
world does not stop at the point where scientific 
certainty ends, and those implementing policy 
usually have no choice but to continue making 
decisions and implementing actions when there 
is scientific uncertainty. This perhaps represents 
the greatest disparity between the aspirations 
of scientists and the reality faced by policy-makers. 
Moreover, the clarion call from scientists ‘we need 
to do more research’ is guaranteed to boil the 
blood of some policy-makers, especially when 
past investment in science has, if anything, added 
to the level of apparent scientific uncertainty. 
Figure 1. Recent debates about the impact of 
neonicotinoid pesticides on bees and other pollinators 
illustrate the complexity of the interface between science 
and government policy. This photograph shows a 
common carder bee (Bombus pascuorum) feeding on a 
dusky cranesbill (Geranium phaeum).PHOTOGRAPH: IAN BOYD
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is to provide information to those 
having to make decisions.
Point of view | Making science count in government
Boyd. eLife 2013;2:e01061. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.01061 3 of 4
Feature article
The integrity of science starts to be undermined 
when scientists themselves suggest that the 
grey area of uncertainty should be occupied by 
them alone rather than being shared with those 
implementing policy. This has happened in many 
of the most controversial areas in my portfolio 
including bovine TB, pesticides and marine 
management.
One of the most insidious trends in these 
and other areas is towards extreme precaution, 
often built around an extreme interpretation 
of the precautionary principle. Some scientists 
can exacerbate this trend towards hazard-
based policy-making by failing to provide bal-
anced assessments of the true risks associated 
with different options, so that the public and 
policy-makers can themselves make informed 
decisions.
As a Chief Scientific Adviser, one of my princi-
pal roles is to ensure that there is a constructive 
dialogue between the scientific community and 
the policy-makers (and those who implement 
policy) within this grey area of uncertainty. Part of 
this role is also to make clear where the certainty 
of the scientific evidence stops and where un-
certainty begins. This interfacing role is chal-
lenged by two main features of the process.
First, there can be disagreement about what 
constitutes certainty in the evidence and this is 
especially true in the environmental sciences where 
most of my responsibilities sit. Many scientists 
are excessively optimistic about the strength of 
evidence supporting particular points of view. 
In common with preclinical studies (Begley, 2013), 
the literature on the environmental impact of 
pesticides has many features that suggest decades 
of systematic bias in how studies have been com-
missioned, constructed and published mean that it 
is nearly impossible to form a clear scientific 
opinion. This has been illustrated most recently 
by issues around the effects of neonicotinoid 
pesticides on pollinators and especially bees 
(Dicks, 2013).
Second, once a direction of travel for policy 
has been agreed, if evidence emerges showing 
that the direction of travel is wrong it can be 
very difficult to change the policy. There is path-
dependency in policy that is very difficult to coun-
teract even where scientific evidence is very 
strong.
Both these factors play off one another to 
create conflict between scientists and policy-
makers and, in the worst cases, can lead to a 
breakdown of the relationship and chronically 
deep-seated mistrust of scientists that can under-
mine the delicate foundation upon which science 
builds relevance within the policy-making envi-
ronment. There is no imperative for science to 
be included within policy-making and, because of 
this, flagship issues where the relationship begins 
to break down, as happened to some extent with 
the management of bovine TB in England, could 
set back the cause of science in government across 
a much wider horizon than just the immediate issue. 
Scientists involved in any particular issue need to 
understand the ramifications of their views for 
quite unrelated areas of policy.
In spite of this, my experience is that govern-
ment strives to build policies around scientific 
evidence to an extent that is often under-
appreciated by scientists and the public. I have 
been impressed by the extent to which politi-
cians and policy officials listen carefully to what 
science says on difficult subjects and often use 
scientific evidence as the hub around which all 
decisions are made. But I have also been surprised 
by just how constrained politicians and policy 
officials are in the flexibility they have for making 
decisions. Policy-making is a messy, sometimes 
chaotic, process because it needs to include 
social, electoral, ethical, cultural, practical, legal 
and economic considerations in addition to sci-
entific evidence.
The scientific community needs to build a 
strong sense about how it fits in to this complex 
mixture to ensure that its contribution to future 
decisions can be maximised. This means sticking 
to the evidence and describing clearly what it 
does and does not say; expressing the balance 
of risk associated with one or other policy option 
and avoiding suggesting that policies are either 
right or wrong; and being willing to make the 
voice of science heard by engaging with the 
mechanisms already available through science 
I have been impressed by the 
extent to which politicians and 
policy officials listen carefully to 
what science says on difficult 
subjects.
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advisory committees, by working with embed-
ded advisers (such as myself), and by being the 
voice of reason, rather than dissent, in the public 
arena.
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